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Abstract 
This research quantifies fragility within the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and translates it 
into supplier risk. The proposed model identifies systemically critical suppliers, where critically is 
characterized in terms of the supplier either being highly coupled within the industrial base, 
operating in a limited competition space, or owning a disproportionately large market share within 
a specific commodity. Each of these properties is quantified using centrality and community 
detection methods. By correctly assessing critical suppliers in the defense base, it allows for a 
methodical approach to addressing standard failure modes that typically result in material 
disruptions in advance of realizing interruptions. Quantifying fragility in supply chains based on 
systemic centrality and communities is a novel effort. Direct application of this process within the 
DIB fundamentally approaches assessing and strengthening our supply base resiliency in a 
completely different manner. 
Keywords: Defense Industrial Base, Fragility, Centrality, Community Detection, Systemic Risk  
Introduction 
The U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) comprises a massive network of suppliers who, 
in totality, offer the capabilities and capacities required to meet and sustain the demand for the 
raw material, components, subsystems, and end-item deliverable weapon systems. 
Government agencies have focused on quantifying multiple dimensions of supply base risk 
within the DIB. In general terms, risk in this context is the uncertainty of events that would 
disrupt the material flow or create system availability delays. The U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has provided multiple reports to the House of Representatives 
Committee on Armed Services recommending quantification methodologies and practices to 
manage supply base risk within the DIB (GAO, 2017). There is a two-part challenge in 
undertaking the effective execution of supply chain risk management within this environment. 
First, the DIB is supporting a range of diverse products and technologies. Secondly, traditional 
supply-chain risk management approaches focus on programmatic impacts versus systemic 
impacts (Sinha et al., 2004). The Department of Defense (DoD) Critical Asset Identification 
Process (CAIP) quantifies Task Critical Assets (TCA) annually (DoD, 2008). For material 
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considered defense-critical or task-critical by the DoD, the rough cost and schedule impact to 
requalify an unknown supply source is as high as $10 million and 9 months. 
To illustrate the challenges of criticality assessment and program-centric supplier risk 
focus, consider a sole-source of supply for precision machined parts. One of the critical risk 
characteristics the GAO identifies is sole source dependencies (only one qualified source). In 
this hypothetical scenario, suppose that our sole source of supply were to declare bankruptcy 
and immediately cease operations. Programmatic consequences manifest as unfavorable 
impacts to cost, schedule, or both. The first realized consequence manifests as a limitation of 
manufacturing at the system level to the material on-hand position. This degraded state persists 
until a qualified alternative source of supply can be established. The total impact will directly 
correlate with the material’s complexity and relative criticality to system-level operational 
requirements. Suppose this supply source is limited to a single program. In that case, the impact 
is limited to the cost and schedule associated with requalification. In this example, identifying 
criticality and risk consequence is program-facing; there is no accounting for more extensive 
dependencies or consequences within the DoD. 
In contrast, consider the same bankruptcy scenario with a tightly coupled supplier within 
the DIB, meaning multiple programs provide manufacturing demand to the supplier. Connecting 
demand amplifies the impact of supply loss across programs, prime contractors, defense 
agencies, and, ultimately, throughout an entire commodity (North American Industry 
Classification System [NAICS]). Government program offices have limited information on single 
sources of supply. This research provides a pragmatic approach to quantifying a supplier’s 
criticality within the DIB relative to its potential negative impact within the defense acquisition 
spectrum and utilizes network analysis to visualize and quantify dependencies within the DIB, 
translating them into system-risk measures. 
Literature Review 
Existing principles, practices, and analytic tools support this research and allow open-
source spending data to characterize dependencies and connectedness and quantify fragility in 
terms of systemic risk. Doing so supports two novel approaches to assessing and strengthening 
our industrial base. First, this approach quantifies the growing dependencies within the industrial 
base, supporting risk management of items like obsolescence, capacity, and availability. 
Second, it allows for a meta-level view of the DIB that supports dynamic modeling and 
simulation of supplier failure propagation through the network (Meyer et al., 2014). 
Fragility and System Risk Within the Defense Industrial Base 
We define fragility within the DIB’s context as the impact of a failing supplier on other 
suppliers, where failing is any disruption in material flow (availability or capacity). The current 
DIB is a fragile network, less conducive to competition, and challenged to scale quickly, grow, or 
innovate (Aviles & Sleeper, 2016). In this sense, fragility manifests as a common-mode failure 
where causal effects leading to failures propagate through the supply chain network. These 
common-mode failures can come from a range of realized impacts stemming from a range of 
macro forces impacting the DIB: reliance on sole-sourcing, uncertainty in defense budgets, and 
“bull-whip” demand cycles. These forces are quantified in terms of risk and realized as network 
fragility before the systemic disruption. Additionally, these forces are fundamental to creating 
uncertainty that stifles industry investment and growth (DoD, 2018). 
While not ideal from a resiliency standpoint, supplier fragility does not directly quantify 
the respective supplier’s risk (Lambert & Cooper, 2000), which means being a critical supplier 
within the DIB is not necessarily a direct indication or a probability that the supplier may fail. 
However, tight coupling or high dependencies within the network are a way to characterize the 
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consequence of a respective supplier failing, most notably in terms of material disruption. 
Disruptions in material flow represent systemic risk, where systemic risk is the uncertainty of 
DIB network disruption. Moreover, realized consequence is associated with the supply base 
being unable to perform at total capacity or efficiency. As stated, there is a shared failure mode 
associated with disruption; the consequences, however, map to multiple dimensions; fragility 
quantification must adequately discern these modes. In this view, the DIB is not dissimilar to a 
complex social network or a financial network. Understanding the potential influence of a 
supplier within a network is a viable strategy to both modernize the industrial base and ensure a 
continuous supply for Defense procurement. 
Traditional Network Analysis Applicability 
Quantifying critical firm financial network analysis provides a pragmatic and scalable 
approach for defining critical suppliers and dependencies in a supply chain. Jorge Chan-Lau 
(2018) offered a risk-dimension mapping framework to quantify systemic risk within a financial 
network. Chan-Lau suggested three dimensions: first, “too-connected-to-fail,” where a tightly 
coupled firm’s failure represented a risk to its neighboring firms; second, “too-important-to-fail,” 
where failure represents a considerable impact, even if the system-wide impact is not 
significant; and finally, “too-big-to-fail,” where the firm has a disproportionally large share of the 
systemic activities (Chan-Lau, 2018). This proposed architecture aligns well to supply chain 
mapping, as within the DIB supply chain, there is a range of highly connected, niche capability 
or massive suppliers.  
Characterization of Supply Chain Risk 
Supply chain risk management (SCRM) relates to the strategic management approach 
of risks, issues, and opportunities impacting a supply chain based on an organizational 
approach to assessing a respective event’s potential consequences (Hallikas, 2004). SCRM 
directly leverages risk management tools in collaboration with supply chain professionals, both 
internally and externally. They focus on translating uncertainties of logistic and material flow 
efforts, material availability, or resources into an actionable plan for execution. Supply chain 
networks are inherently complex and dynamic; therefore, SCRM frameworks focus on providing 
effective risk management over a broad operational environment. Fundamentally, SCRM is the 
principle that an enterprise needs to prevent material disruptions throughout its entire supply 
base or supply chain. Critical measures of effectiveness are a systematic means to identify 
potential disruption sources, an enterprise approach to be an assessment of internal supply 
chain risks as well as an assessment of supplier or sub-tier supplier risk, assigned cognizant 
supply chain professionals managing identified risk, and, finally, the systematic means for 
continuous monitoring of disruptions or disruption sources (Blackhurst et al., 2008). 
By definition, a supply chain inherently relies on connected critical providers, knowledge 
points, or handoffs, where a failure within the chain disrupts its coupled partner. In each 
respective reliance, uncertainty manifests as vulnerability; SCRM reduces vulnerability 
throughout a supply chain’s entire value stream (Hallikas, 2004). Supply chain risk exists in 
multiple dimensions: natural disasters, raw material shortages, market forces, distribution 
challenges, or product or part technical maturity. This broad range of risks translates into a 
considerable exposure position that scales with the enterprise’s size and complexity (Finch, 
2004). SCRM typically incorporates the following processes as part of the risk management 
framework: identification, assessment, mitigation, acceptance, and monitoring of supply chain 
risks (Chopra & Meindl, 2009). It is a relatively heterogeneous literature base for SCRM, and the 
majority rely on traditional risk measures to influence action that can improve the agility or 
robustness of a supply chain. Supply chain agility is the speed an enterprise can react with 
should disruption or threat emerge within the supply base.  
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Quantifying this measure is the manufacturing lead time for supplier material, where 
minimizing the make-span or procurement-span for the material is optimal. Also included in 
supply chain agility is the responsiveness to changing to market needs, where an organizational 
goal is to build a supply base capable of transition to a different or modified material solution 
without impacting delivery reliability. Supply chain robustness shares some similarities with 
supply chain agility, where the notable delta is not an organization’s ability to adapt but rather 
the quantified incurred disruption of a singular event. In a robust supply chain, when a change 
occurs, the supply base inherently provides more time to plan a course of action. Additionally, a 
supply chain’s robustness measures a supply chain’s ability to carry out its functions in a 
degraded state. Using a major natural disaster as an example of a disruptor, if an impacted 
supply base can maintain deliveries without a strategic shift in execution, it would be fair to say 
that the base was robust and not impacted by a singular event. 
Quantification of supply chain risk is the product of a consequence in terms of an event’s 
cost impact or material disruption incurring schedule increase compared against the event’s 
likelihood. Like traditional risk management approaches, this product approach prioritizes and 
characterizes the risk and opportunity spectrum (Hubbard, 2009). This approach is the most 
popular methodology for quantifying risk, both within a supply chain and in the broader sense of 
risk management. Regardless of this approach’s debatable effectiveness, it is, as stated, widely 
accepted within supply chain professional organizations (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). 
Factors likely to disrupt a supplier, product, program, or service establish risk 
archetypes; these archetypes help suggest the likelihood of impact realization (Outdot, 2010). 
Traditional supply chain measures supporting this quantification are a supplier’s financial 
viability, operational capacity or expertise, or a quantifiable supplier resiliency score. 
Additionally, certifications provided by compliance organizations such as ISO or the National 
Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program (NADCAP) indicate a low likelihood 
of an adverse event occurring via a supplier’s successful acquisition retainment of certification. 
Finally, quantification of supply chain risk in customer value is germane in industry practice, 
where the primary measure is on-time delivery and order correctness. Supply chains with risk in 
a customer value dimension manage threats associated with procuring the wrong or defective 
products within their demand portfolio (Nishat, 2006). This risk dimension aligns with traditional 
measures of quality management systems: defects per unit, the accuracy of an order, or rework 
cycles (Rao & Goldsby, 2009). 
Centrality and Community Measures of Criticality 
Provided a sufficiently complex network exists, there will inherently be relationships of 
either highly connected nodes or tightly coupled nodes within a localized area (Newman, 2008). 
The well-defined principles and power laws that support these concepts stem from social 
network analysis and are both long-standing and proven (Bonacich, 1987). There is a nearly 
endless amount of research available where the application of centrality measures supports 
critical nodes or vertices identification within a network for a range of practical purposes, most 
notably the continued evolution of the use case of modeling influence in a social network (Wang 
& Street, 2015). Beyond social networks, these methods are in use in biology research to 
identify critical species in pollination communities (González et al., 2010), in health research to 
assess associations between measures of network centrality and health in a retirement 
community (Schafer, 2011), and within the financial industry to identify and assess the risk of 
financial firms (Chan-Lau, 2018). The common link in each application’s approach is a need to 
understand the network’s relationships that support the characterization of node importance or 
insignificance. 
Centrality and community indices directly answer what is fundamentally important to a 
node, vertex, or network. The output is a tangible function providing real-values for node and 
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flow importance concerning the analyzed network. As stated previously, the word “importance” 
can relate to a range of actual definitions based on the analysis’s intent. Two general categories 
of “importance” have been proposed (Vivas et al., 2019). First, centrality indices reflecting 
network flow are critical nodes predicated on the classification of centrality based on the flow 
considered vital to a network (Opsahl et al., 2010). As an example, in financial network analysis, 
this is the amount of money flowing from firm to firm, where the out-strength of a node reflects 
direct spend or transfer of funds, and the in-strength represents receipt or acceptance of funds 
(Chan-Lau, 2018). This example results in the quantification of node importance in a minimum 
of two dimensions, dependency on money distribution (out) and the total holdings or receipts 
(in). Second, “importance” can be measured in terms of the coupling of nodes within a network. 
For example, in the modeling of pollination generalist species of plants, a tightly coupled sub-
network of nodes increases the probability of cross-pollination among the subsets (Alvarez-
Socorro et al., n.d.). 
Leveraging Centrality and Community to Quantify Systemic Risk 
As a novel approach to quantifying risk, vulnerabilities, and imbalances within the DIB, 
this research proposes that centrality and community measures provide critical insight into two 
macro forces threatening a supply chain. First, connectedness-based risk rankings quantify 
systemic risk. Second, community measures quantify fragility. A supplier can be both 
systemically risky and fragile. In this paper, the following arguments establish systemic risk, 
fragility, and imbalance: systemic risk directly relates to a supplier’s criticality within a supply 
chain network. A supplier with more influence carries a more significant negative impact on the 
overall network in the event of a disruption; it is, therefore, more systemically risky than a 
weakly-connected supplier. Fragility indicates vulnerability or the lack of supply chain network 
robustness (Perera et al., 2018). Larger communities with more outstanding overall systemic 
dependencies illustrate vulnerability within the supply chain network. Finally, imbalance 
represents disproportional levels of both risk and fragility for both commodities and suppliers.  
In the remaining sections of the paper, Methodology details the network creation and 
structure and the applicability of specific centrality measures and community, thereby providing 
acquisition agencies with lower sub-tier visibility regardless of program or procurement 
authority. Results uses Aircraft NAICS as a use-case to apply network analysis; this analysis 
supports a key research objective of detecting, evaluating, and characterizing supply base 
threats capable of disrupting material availability. Lastly, Conclusions presents the conclusions 
of this research, with the intent that through further modeling and via a coupled methodical 
supplier development approach, a more resilient and responsive DIB can be developed. 
Methodology 
This section briefly describes the methods utilized to calculate centrality measures and 
assess modularity to support community identification.1 Systemically critical suppliers exist as 
highly linked nodes throughout the network (central nodes), tightly coupled links within 
neighboring nodes (community nodes), or a state where the supplier is both central and tightly 
bound within a community. 
Data Aggregation and Network Structure 
This research is limited to unclassified, open-source acquisition data; no prime 
generated or propriety data is within the analysis. Therefore, the analysis is subject to contractor 
reporting accuracy for material spend disclosed per the Federal Funding Accountability and 
 
 
1 Underlying math foundations are provided as references. 
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Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA). The FFATA requires that any federal contract, grant, loan, 
and other financial assistance awards of more than $25,000 are on a publicly accessible and 
searchable website. Data reporting is limited to first-tier suppliers; subcontract award 
information contains awardee, DUNS information, parent company information, award date, 
program usage, and material type. The provided illustrations show the type of data and views 
available from open-source government data for Army Missile Procurement (U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, 2021). 
 
 
Figure 1. Spending Over Time (Fiscal Year [FY] 2017+ Army Missiles) 
 
Figure 2. Spending by Category (FY2017+ Army Missiles) 
Defense programs or NAICS commodities facilitate the analysis of relations between 
objects. Our vertices or nodes will represent the following organizations procuring agencies, 
prime contractors, and subcontractors (reference Figure 3). Edges will communicate both the 
existence of a relationship and a directed path or flow of acquisition dollars. Reference Figure 4 
for an example of the visualization output. 
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Figure 4. FY2019 Army Missile Procurement Visualization 
Centrality (Node Level) 
Centrality measures allow for identifying systemically critical suppliers in the supplier 
base; nodes reflect specific contractors and sub-contractors, node size reflects the centrality 
score, and color of the node reflects segregated communities’ subsystems. Table 1 summarizes 
measures of centrality. Degree in this context is a local measure; the DIB financial network 
requires a global view of the supplier’s connections. Alternative centrality measures are required 
to characterize systemically critical suppliers within the defense network correctly.  
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Table 1. Measures of Centrality 
Item Basis Measure DIB Applicability Source 
Degree 
Importance score based 
on the number of links 
held by each node 
Direct 
connections 
In-degree and out-degree 
measures to better 
understand the flow of 
material 




The number of times a 
node lies on the shortest 





High betweenness indicates 
critical suppliers that are 
highly active within the 
network 
Estrada et al., 
2009 
Closeness 
Time required  
to spread information 
from a node to the other 





Suppliers with high 
closeness centrality levels 
support mitigation of the 
impacts arising from 






Represents the relative 
strength or influence 





Quantifying the propagation 
of failure tied to disruption 






assigned score reflects 
influence within the 
network, but PageRank 
also considers link 
direction and weight 
Node 
Influence 
The extent of failure 
propagated through a 
community of suppliers or 
across a commodity 
Page, 1999 
 
Communities (Network Level) 
While centrality measures provide insight on systemically critical suppliers, the 
complexity and size of a macro-view of defense procurement requires an approach capable of 
accurately decomposing highly interconnected nodes into communities. Doing so supports the 
quantification of fragility in the multiple dimensions in which it can exist. The usage of 
community detection allows for analysis of tightly coupled suppliers, further facilitating 
quantification of likely common failure-mode points within the network. As the applicability of 
centrality measures, multiple methodologies of community detection are germane in network 
science. Table 2 shows some of these community measures. 
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Table 2. Measures of Community 
Item Basis Measure DIB Applicability Source 
Network 
Diameter 
Edge count of the shortest 
path across the network Complexity 
Supports quantification of 
local community authority 
or the lack of authority 





The level of 
interconnectivity between 
nodes  










Assessing program, agency, 





The strength of the 
allocation of subsystems 











Reference Figure 5 for an overview of the applied risk framework. This graph depicts 
relative community strength on the x-axis, where a higher assigned score represents a more 
substantial connected supplier. EigenCentrality scores compose the y-axis, indicating a 
supplier’s strength or influence over other nodes in the network. Finally, the supplier node size 
represents a function of its relative community ranking and its overall authority within the 
network combined with the supplier’s weighted indegree. Leveraging Centrality and Community 
to Quantify Systemic Risk proposed systemic risk, which is a risk to the overall supply chain 
network’s efficiency or effectiveness, which could be determined using total supply-base 
influence measures. Two forms of risk are present: (1) the local criticality of a supplier, where 
subsequent supplier risk can be further defined using traditional defense industrial risk 
measures (reference Table 3) and (2) the systemic risk a node presents within its overall 
network or community. 
 
Figure 5. Mapping Risk to Centrality and Community 
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Four distinct zones form using this analysis technique. First is High-Systemic Risk and 
Low-Systemic Fragility; suppliers in this zone would carry considerable network influence but 
would have a lower strength of connection or community impact; this zone should be free of 
qualifying nodes, as a weakly connected supplier should not be supported with a high influence 
ranking. Second is Low-System Risk and Low Systemic-Fragility; suppliers in this zone would 
reflect both lower influence and community coupling, meaning they pose a low systemic threat; 
however, they carry considerable quantified local risk; as an example, prime contractors tend to 
appear here; they carry a disproportionally large total of spend with low in-strength. While these 
nodes are generally more central, nodes identified with more significant risk are more systemic. 
Third is High-Systemic Risk and High-Systemic Fragility; these suppliers are considered 
imbalanced; they are critical to the network from a community perspective; they also carry 
significant systemic risk. Additionally, their influence and in-degree can establish local risk. 
Fourth is Low-Systemic Risk and High-Systemic Fragility; these suppliers represent the 
absence of network robustness. 
These measures are relative to the scope of the network analysis completed. For 
example, the Department of the Army spending analysis will result in a different set of identified 
risk, fragility, and imbalance than the same analysis focused on Department of the Navy 
spending. Moreover, the combination of both agencies will again shift quantification and output. 
Furthermore, analyzing modules or communities within an analysis will provide a different set of 
focus suppliers. This dynamic nature is critical for correctly identifying the specific threats for a 
cognizant program office or prime contractor and understanding the overlapping or shared risk.  
Mapping Risk to Traditional Supply Chain Risk Areas 
It is reasonable to leverage centrality and community measures against traditional risk 
areas. Table 3 provides GAO-identified risk areas threatening the DIB (GAO, 2018). By 
selecting node level measures with known supply chain network implications, further evaluation 
of systemically risky or fragile suppliers is achievable in terms of their local risk factors. 
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Highest Eigenvector 
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Trend analysis supplier 
CAGR (decreasing) 
Highest Eigenvector 
measure within a 






the prime level, 




external to the 
United States 
DUNS Trend (6-month, 
12-month) – Couple with 
community measures, the 
financial viability of the 
community, commercial 
market share 
Parent DUNS, Highest 
Eigenvector measure 
within a network; within 
a commodity  
 
As an example, reference Figure 6. This subset view of suppliers shows suppliers with 
the least betweenness centrality while still holding system risk. Closeness centrality is critical to 
the effectiveness of the supply chain in the presence of a degraded state or inaccurate demand 
planning (Perera et al., 2018); these detractors contribute to the “bull-whip” effect in supply 
chains (Xu et al., 2014). In our provided view, these are essentially critical suppliers within the 
network with limited or nonexistent closeness measures. They cannot share total demand and 
are therefore risk considerations for traditional concerns like sole sourcing, limited capacity, or 
loss of skill or equipment. 
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Figure 6. Network Measures Translated Into Sole-Source Risk 
The following section provides the application of these processes. They show the use of the 
methods outlined as they relate to Aircraft manufacturing in FY2020. The output of this analysis 
will be the identification of systemic risk, fragility, and imbalance within the supply base. 
Results 
Application: FY2020 NAICS – Aircraft Manufacturing 
This analysis evaluated roughly $25 billion in disclosed spend. Key prime contractors 
were BAE, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon Technologies. NAICS analysis was limited to the 
following codes and their respective titles: Aircraft Manufacturing (336411), Aircraft Engine and 
Engine Part Manufacturing (336412), and Aircraft Parts and Auxiliary Equipment Manufacturing 
(336413). As a commodity, this represents deliverable items such as air vehicles, gas turbines, 
engine components, avionic subsystems, and engineering services. The primary procuring 
agencies are of the DoD, provided as follows in order of out-degree: Department of the Air 
Force, Department of the Navy, Defense Logistics Agency, Department of the Army, U.S. 
Special Operations Command, and the Defense Contract Management Agency. 
 
Figure 7. FY2020 NAICS Aircraft Supplier Network 
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Per Figure 7, the node’s size reflects the network EigenCentrality score, conveying 
suppliers with network influence. The assigned node color indicates a subsystem within the 
network, and these are an output of the analysis of network modularity. Assigned modularity 
aligns with either a principal prime contractor, a specialized commodity provider with limited 
direct competitors (notable examples: sand castings, energetic materials, solid-state rocket 
motors), or a family of parent-company–owned sub-contract suppliers. As an example of wholly-
owned subsidiaries driving communities, the suppliers United Technologies, Parker Hannifin, 
Aerojet, and L3 essentially build independent sub-tier mapping communities.  
Aircraft Centrality Measures 
Centrality for each supplier is quantified in four different measures: weighted degree, 
closeness, eigenvector centrality, and PageRank. These outputs provide the basis for fragility 
assessment; they inherently communicate the network’s criticality based on a critical node’s 
impact. The consequence in these terms is relative to the overall network versus a specific 
program or contractor; impact by a prime contractor can, however, directly map to an individual 
program. Table 4 summarizes the overlap of centrality-based network measures representing 
the systemic risk of sub-tier suppliers relative to the overall NAIC Aircraft supply base. 
Table 4. Fragility Assessment Overlap (Centrality) 
 
 
When looking at the overlap of measures, suppliers’ composition should draw attention to 
prime contractors’ dependencies within the network. Table 5 shows the top 10 overlapping 
suppliers for this network. 
  















































Weighted Degree 8 8 2 6 Weighted Degree 17 16 5 13
Betweenness 27 10 4 10 Betweenness 41 25 4 20
Closeness 26 45 5 10 Closeness 45 68 5 23
PageRank 6 6 5 3 PageRank 9 7 6 6
Eigen Centrality 25 28 28 6 Eigen Centrality 31 28 28 7
Weighted Degree 80% 80% 20% 60% Weighted Degree 68% 64% 20% 52%
Betweenness 54% 100% 40% 100% Betweenness 41% 100% 16% 80%
Closeness 52% 90% 50% 100% Closeness 45% 68% 20% 92%
PageRank 12% 12% 10% 30% PageRank 9% 7% 6% 24%
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Table 5. Top 10 Overlapping Suppliers (Aircraft NAIC FY2020) 
SUPPLIER NAME MODULARITY CLASS 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 92 
LEONARDO SPA 92 
EATON CORPORATION PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 92 
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION 92 
BOEING COMPANY, THE 92 
AMETEK INC. 92 
L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 93 
Transdigm Group Incorporated 93 
HEICO CORPORATION 93 
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORPORATION 122 
 
The presence of crucial prime contractors results from their weighted degree per the 
analysis provided in Table 4. In this example, suppliers like United Technology, Boeing, and 
Northrop Grumman are sub-contracts to prime spending. Their complete failure concerning the 
network (e.g., bankruptcy) is improbable. Overlapping firms carry the highest overall fragility or 
concern. Their respective modularity classifications convey the interdependencies that exist. 
These suppliers are not only critical to the performance of the supply chain network but are also 
highly dependent on each other. Traditional monitoring methods and assignment of fragility, 
criticality, or risk based on total monetary spend, whether it be by program or supplier, are 
insufficient to characterize total industry fragility. 
Expanding on the measurement intent outlay provided within the Methodology section, 
consider the following: The discernible differences in identified suppliers indicate that different 
centrality measures indicate that dimensions of fragility exist for supply chain networks by 
lumping measures together or looking myopically at total spending hides suppliers with 
considerable network influence. Table 6 provides a conceptual approach to matching 
dimensional fragility measures with traditional supply base risk measures.  
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Table 6. Centrality Based Fragility Mapped to Systemic Risk Drivers 
Measure Fragility Dimension Systemic Risk Drivers 
Weighted Degree Primarily parent companies, or direct 
subcontract award to major prime 
contractors. The network is dependent on 
forecasted demand 
• Demand Uncertainty 
• Budget Uncertainty 
• Natural Disaster or 
Malicious Attack 
Betweenness Composed of “bridge suppliers,” this model 
moves to the first tier of the prime 
contractor supplier spend. As an effect, 
these are primarily parent suppliers or 
familiar sources of supply for generic 
material (electronic components, fasteners) 
• Foreign Dependence 
• Single Sources of 
Supply 
Closeness Relatively high overlap of closeness and 
weighted degree indicates that the 
network’s agility or speed depends on large 
tier suppliers. Respective capabilities and 
capacities should facilitate shorter paths 
through the network. 
• Limited production 
capacity 
• Foreign Dependence 
• Natural Disaster or 
Malicious Attack 
PageRank The PageRank algorithm consistently 
highlights influential suppliers outside of 
the top spend. 
• Obsolete Items 
• Financial Viability of 
Suppliers 
• Sole sourcing 
• Loss of skill or 
equipment 
EigenCentrality They are highly coupled or connected 
suppliers within the network; their 
dependencies cross over programs, 
procuring agencies, and even commodities. 
• Limited production 
capacity 
• Foreign Dependence 
• Loss of skill or 
equipment 
• Financial viability 
• Sole source 
• Natural Disaster or 
Malicious Attack 
 
Aircraft Supply Chain Network – Systemic Risk 
The suppliers listed in Table 7 carry the highest systemic risk within this commodity code. 
The EigenCentrality measure dictates the supplier (displayed in Figure 8). There is a range of 
technical capability provisions listed, and this suggests critical suppliers across a broad 
spectrum of provided solutions. The influence of these suppliers propagates through the supply 
chain network. Their disruption impacts parent companies, prime contractors, and coupled 
procurement agencies. It is important to note that these suppliers share community measures; 
Aircraft Supply Chair Network – Systemic Module Risk describes the impacts to systemic risk at 
a community level. 
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Table 7. Top 10 Systemic Risk Suppliers 
SUPPLIER NAME PROVISION 
GOODRICH CORPORATION Lighting Systems, Actuation, and Control 
HAMILTON CORPORATION Propulsion Systems, Flight Control Systems 
COBHAM INC. Antenna, Electronic Subsystem, RAD-Hard 
AMI INDUSTRIES, INC. Emergency evacuation systems, Seating systems, Life rafts 
B/E AEROSPACE, INC. Structures 
INTERTRADE LIMITED Recertified airframe and engine parts 
EXOTIC METALS FORMING LLC Engine ducting and exhausts 
L3HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. R.F. equipment, Data Link Communication 
WESCAM INC Air Surveillance and Reconnaissance 




Figure 8. Aircraft Systemic Risk Visualization 
 
Aircraft Supply Chain Network – Systemic Module Risk 
A crucial module or communities that formed within the network centered around United 
Technologies Corporation (UTC). UTC is a parent company within this analysis; the basis for 
this community is derived from the material acquisition across NAICS either directly to UTC or 
one of their wholly-owned subsidiaries. While the complete list of suppliers will not result in a 
complete module composed of UTC subsidiaries, Table 8 provides a list of the top 10 
systemically risky suppliers within the module. This analysis provides a supply chain manager 
insight into critical dependencies within a community. More notably, this analysis supports 
further risk characterization based on the supplier’s authority and valuation (size of the node); 
reference Figure 9.  
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Table 8. Systemic Risk - Module Analysis 
SUPPLIER NAME PARENT COMPANY 
HAMILTON SUNDSTRAND CORPORATION UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
GOODRICH CORPORATION UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
Rockwell Collins, Inc. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
AMI INDUSTRIES, INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
B/E AEROSPACE, INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
INTERTRADE LIMITED UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
GOODRICH ACTUATION SYSTEMS SAS UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
ROSEMOUNT AEROSPACE INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
J. A. REINHARDT & CO., INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
GOODRICH LIGHTING SYSTEMS, INC. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
GOODRICH ACTUATION SYSTEMS LTD UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION 
 
 
Figure 9. Systemic Risk - Module Analysis 
Aircraft Supply Chain Network – Systemic Fragility 
Table 9 lists top identified suppliers as a function of their authority and relative 
component strength measure. These represent weak points in the supply chain network. They 
are network vulnerabilities with the general implication that there is no ready-made set of 
alternative sourcing options. 
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Table 9 – Top 10 Systemic Fragility Suppliers 
SUPPLIER NAME PROVISION 
ACME EMBEDDED SOLUTIONS Ruggedized Computing Systems 
SIERRA ALLOYS COMPANY Titanium Manufacturing 
PERILLO INDUSTRIES, INC. Power Subsystems 
FIBREFORM ELECTRONICS, INC. Precision Machining 
TORAY ADVANCED COMPOSITES ADS, LLC Composite Materials 
S&L AEROSPACE METALS, LLC Structural Machining 
RIVERSIDE MACHINE & ENGINEERING, INC. Precision Machining 
MICROWAVE DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES, INC. Waveguide Components 
ADVANCED CONVERSION TECHNOLOGY, INC. Power Subsystems 
BOEDEKER PLASTICS, INC. Molded Plastics 
 
Aircraft Supply Chain Network – Imbalance 
Given the massive nature of this supply chain network, narrowing systemic risk and 
fragility to each category’s top 10 drivers is less than ideal for taking a pragmatic approach to 
improving the base’s robustness. The concept of imbalance introduced in the Literature Review 
can narrow systemic risk and fragility into network-specific threats, as shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10. Aircraft NAICS - Imbalance Assessment 
In Aircraft manufacturing, the following sub commodities are systemically risky and 
fragile: titanium manufacturing and forging, engine component manufacturing, structures, and 
precision machining. The suppliers providing this material share similar network influence 
measures and are primarily shared sources of supply regardless of the prime contractor, 
consequently resulting in a disproportional (imbalanced) amount of total spend distribution and, 
consequently, network criticality assignment. This analysis augmented with targeted supplier 
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development efforts would both highlight and make mitigation activities actionable. These are 
critical points within the supply base that could be augmented with direct investment in 
capabilities, training, and long-term demand stabilization or additional suppliers developed to 
build redundancy in the overall network. 
Conclusions 
We have presented a detailed approach for leveraging centrality and community 
measures to quantify systemic risk, vulnerability, and imbalance in defense supply chain 
networks. This approach evaluates defense procurement supply-base resiliency by commodity, 
program execution office, or overarching defense procurement agency. As a result, the following 
three objectives and their conclusions are as follows: First, systemic risk is quantified using 
centrality measures to identify the most critical nodes within the network. A supplier with more 
influence carries a more significant negative impact on the overall network in the event of 
disruption and is, therefore, more systemically risky. Second, DIB fragility is quantified using 
community measures; facilitating identification of communities with more significant overall 
systemic dependencies illustrates vulnerability within the supply chain network. Third, imbalance 
represents disproportional levels of both risk and fragility in both specific commodities and 
suppliers. 
To illustrate the application of these concepts, an FY2020 view of Aircraft manufacturing 
was provided. This analysis addressed 80,000+ records of subcontract procurement for material 
ranging from fasteners to avionic subsystems. This visualization facilitated the identification of 
suppliers in terms of systemic risk and fragility in the following technical areas: power 
subsystems, structures, forgings, microwave components, and electronic components. 
Furthermore, a novel approach to quantifying traditional risk measures using centrality and 
community detection was proposed, highlighting sole source risks within a network. 
By leveraging network analysis principles and practices, we have demonstrated how 
application within the DIB can differentiate supplier criticality. Future work will refine supplier risk 
measures and integrate trend analysis to quantify industry contraction or expansion by 
commodity. Additionally, a dynamic version of this modeling application is in work, supporting 
modeling and simulation of the DIB to quantify the consequences of systemic failures further.  
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